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Abstract
Reducing disparities among regions within European countries is the aim of European and
national structural policies. In particular, a European grant contributes to the German
governmental program for equalizing regional unemployment. The goal is to bring it down
to the national average by creating new and/or by safeguarding existing jobs.
In the given paper the distribution of available aid among 271 German labor market
regions is considered as an econometric decision problem. At first, the dependence of the
unemployment rate on the amount of aid is estimated for each eligible region. Using this
dependence, the variance of regional unemployment rates is expressed as a function of the
regional subsidies. The optimal aid distribution among regions is obtained by minimizing
this variance subject to the total budget constraint and administrative restrictions.
The optimal figures computed are compared with statistical data for 2000–2002. They
show that the regional unemployment in West Germany could be equalized better (with
variance 3.50 against the actual 4.40) and with a simultaneous decrease in the average
unemployment in West Germany from 7.45 to 7.28%. In East Germany all regions are
eligible, implying no administrative constraints and a high optimization flexibility. It
enables almost perfectly equalize regional indices down to the variance 0.28 against the
actual 9.76.
Under the model assumptions, the actual results of the equalizing policy could be
attained by half the budget granted. These underused possibilities explain the low ef-
ficiency of active labor market policies reported in empirical studies. To improve their
performance, some tools for optimally distributing subsidies and predicting their effects
are suggested.
Keywords: European Commission, structural fund grants, regional policy, equalizing
regional unemployment rates, econometric optimization model.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Regional unemployment
The regional unemployment rate is one of most important indicators of socio-economical
equilibrium. Besides, it characterizes the regional governmental performance and serves
as a governmental assistance criterion. Its equalization all over the country is expected
to improve the national output and to decrease the inflation pressure (Taylor 1996).
According to Fothergill (2001) and Elhorst (2003), the unemployment disparity among
regions within countries is becoming a source of troubles in the European Union. They
are getting comparable with that among the countries themselves (Elhorst 1995, Taylor
and Bradley 1997, European Commission 1999). The extension of the European Union
to the East, where the economical imbalance is aggravated by transition processes, makes
this problem even more acute.
Compared with the unemployment at national and intra-national levels, the regional
unemployment is relatively little studied. The 3630 page Handbook of Labor Economics
(Ashenfelter and Layard 1986, Ashenfelter and Card 1999) contains nothing on regional
unemployment, and the Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics contains just a half-
relevant chapter on urban unemployment (Crampton 1999). All of this illustrates how far
the topic is from the mainstream research.
The belief that the nature of regional unemployment is similar to that of unemployment
in general is rather superficial. The factors which are thought to explain disparities among
countries (e.g., Phelps 1994, Malinvaud 1994, Bean 1994, OECD 1994, Scarpetta 1996),
like institutions of wage bargaining, social security, retirement, and taxes are not relevant
to regions. Indeed, they differ between countries but not between regions within countries;
consequently some other factors should exist.
Elhorst (2003) has reviewed 41 empirical studies, where regional unemployment dif-
ferentials are explained with the help of regional data. These models (some are not
implemented in formulas) are classified as follows:
1. Single equation models (one independent and one dependent variable):
(a) empirical models, mostly with no equations but nevertheless suggesting factors
which might be used as explanatory variables,
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(b) the inverse unemployment-vacancy relationship, or the Beveridge curve (e.g.,
Jones and Manning 1992, Holzer 1993),
(c) the cyclical sensitivity model which explains the regional unemployment as a
linear function of the national unemployment; such a model makes sense if
the regional and national unemployment cointegrate in the sense of Engle and
Granger (1987) into an equilibrium configuration (e.g., Chapman 1991, Martin
1997, Baddeley et al. 1998),
(d) the amenity model which explains the regional unemployment as a function of
aggregated attractiveness of the regions, for instance, reflected by the wage-to-
infrastructure-index ratio (e.g., Marston 1985, Montgomery 1993).
2. Implicit models
(a) the migration-based model which explains the regional unemployment by mi-
gration flows (e.g., Molho 1995, Groenewold 1997),
(b) the NAIRU model (= non-accelerating inflation rates of unemployment), or the
Phillips and wage-setting curves (e.g., Jones and Hyclak 1989, Payne 1995),
(c) the Blanchard–Katz model (1992) with four equations which links the regional
unemployment rate to labor supply, labor demand, wage-setting, and migration
of both population and firms; a similar study on the regional unemployment
in the European Union is performed by Decressin and Fata´s (1995).
3. The accounting identity models which are based on estimating the impact of
a single individual, depending on his identification either as a local unemployed,
or migrant, in-commuter, or out-commuter, etc. (e.g., Gordijn and Wissen 1992,
Wissen and Ekamper 1995).
4. The simultaneous models with interactions, which take into account the feed-
back of the regional unemployment to the explanatory labor market variables, like
the labor force participation rate, degree of employment and earnings, labor demand,
etc. (e.g., Bilger et al. 1991, Blanchard and Katz 1992, Blackaby and Manning 1992,
Decressin and Fata´s 1995).
As concluded by Elhorst, the models reviewed provide clear-cut trends in the inter-
action between the regional unemployment and other labor market variables. It should
be noted however that these models directly or indirectly assume a kind of labor market
equilibrium, which is a certain idealization. The factors which violate the equilibrium,
like governmental creation of new jobs, are not explicitly taken into account.
1.2 Active labor market policies
Active labor market policies are aimed at reducing unemployment and are implemented in
all developed countries (Fay 1996, Heckman et al. 1999, Martin 2000, Steiner and Hagen
2002). They fall into three main schemes.
1.2. ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICIES 13
1. Job creation is offering subsidies to wages mainly for short-running projects in non-
profit organizations. These jobs are often given to former long-term unemployed
and are usually restricted to terms of about one year.
2. Structural adjustments is also offering wage subsidies but with other goals and in a
closer collaboration with private firms. The subsidies are aimed at integrating the
employees into the main activities and are given for terms of about three years.
3. Public training is a number of educational measures paid by the employment of-
fice. They are aimed at improving the chances for employment and increasing the
employment stability.
According to Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit (2003b), during the period of 1990–2002 only
in East Germany 6.5 Mio workers, which is about the number of active employees, were
involved in these programs with the overall budget 138 billion EURO. Expenditures of
such a range require systematic analysis of their effects.
Microeconomic studies are based on comparisons between groups of participants and
groups of non-participants; for surveys see Hagen and Steiner (2000) and Hujer and
Caliendo (2001). As follows from these surveys, there is no clear evidence of either positive,
or negative effects of the German active labor market policies on the future prospects of
the participants. This indefiniteness has been also confirmed by the recent report based
on large administrative data (Hujer et al. 2003).
Hagen (2003) criticizes the microeconomic approach for its stable unit treatment value
assumption (Rubin 1980). In the given context it means that the control groups of non-
participants are not affected by the programs. Since the programs are very extensive,
their indirect effects on the non-participants are likely to be quite significant. It implies a
violation of the basic assumption, making questionable the microeconomic investigations.
The macroeconomic approach, on the contrary, assumes simultaneity and reciprocal
influence of all factors within the economy. Several authors selected it as more appropriate
for estimating the indirect and net effects of active labor market policies (Heckman et al.
1999). However, the macroeconomic studies based on regional data reveal no unambiguous
trends either (Bu¨ttner and Pray 1998, Steiner et al. 1998, Hagen and Steiner 2000, Schmid
et al. 2001, Blien et al. 2002, Fertig et al. 2002, Hagen 2003).
In the most recent study Hagen (2003) applied three macroeconomic approaches to
East German regional data:
• an augmented matching function approach which evaluates the effects of the active
labor market policies on regional matching efficiency,
• a reduced-form approach based on the Beveridge curve which assesses the effects
on the regional job seeker rate, including both unemployed and participants in the
active labor market policies,
• a regional labor demand approach.
The main finding was a certain negative effect of job creation and no significant effect
of structural adjustments and of public training on the regional employment. In spite of
having used alternative approaches, a number of questions remained open.
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It should be noticed that both micro- and macro- modelling do not take into account
such general factors as accelerating technological transformations with new requirements
to the employees, support of Eastern Europe and globalization which channelled financial
flows out of developed countries and moved some industries and services to the Third
World, and the recession which started in Asia in the mid-1990s and then expanded to
the West. Their negative implications can mask the positive effect of the active labor
market policies, without which the labor market situation might become much worse.
1.3 Unemployment and optimization
The point left with little attention is the quality of realizing governmental programs. Ac-
cording to Lechner and Smith (2003), “caseworkers do not do a very good job of allocating
their unemployed clients to the subprograms so as to maximize their subsequent employ-
ment prospects.” It can imply that not the policies intended but their implementation is
responsible for their low efficiency reported in empirical studies. In a market economy,
underused possibilities and a non-optimal behavior often cause redistributions and struc-
tural shifts which can lead away from the results expected. For instance, an imbalanced
job creation causes migrations which reduce local effects.
Lechner and his colleagues (2003) took part in developing a statistical expert system
which customizes the offer for each particular unemployed client. This may be the only
instance of any kind of optimization approach in the vast research on active labor market
policies. (In a personal communication Lechner was somewhat surprised to learn about my
optimization interpretation of his work. Elhorst after having compiled a comprehensive
survey was not aware of any optimization approach.)
Such a general neglect of optimization methods is amazing in two respects. The role
which optimization plays in the modern economy is hard to overestimate (Samuelson
1971). As far as it concerns market relations, the (quasi) optimization is guided by ‘the
invisible hand’, Adam Smith’s (1776) metaphor for competition. This, however, is not the
case in the public sector with central planning and budget governmental programs. Con-
sequently, optimization should be primarily applied in the public sector and particularly
in the domain discussed.
On the other hand, almost all quantitative studies on unemployment are essentially
econometrical. Yet the founders of econometrics, the first winners of the Nobel Prize in
economics (1969) Jan Tinbergen and Ragnar Frisch always linked econometrics to opti-
mization. Among other things, both Tinbergen and Frisch were faced to unemployment
problems and in the 1950s made pioneering contributions to econometric optimization
models (Frisch 1963, Tinbergen 1952, 1956, see also Johansen 1974); this topic was se-
lected by Frisch for his Nobel Address (1970). Consequently, there exist also historical
prerequisites for interactions between unemployment studies, econometrics, and optimiza-
tion.
How does it work in practice? To give an idea, imagine that we optimize unemployment
vs. inflation within 0 ÷ 10% by controlling inflation by the Central Bank’s interest rate.
The operational space is two dimensional, with axes being the unemployment rate U and
the inflation rate I shown in Figure 1.1. (The direction of axes is inverted to keep the
top-right direction of improvement as traditional in utility theory.)
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Figure 1.1: Econometric optimization model
Certainly, not every combination of indices in the plain Unemployment–Inflation is
attainable. Econometrical methods based on statistical observations enable us to estimate
the analytical relation between unemployment and inflation called the Phillips curve. In
Figure 1.1 it is shown by the line U + I = 12%. Thus an econometric model imposes a
constraint, restricting the feasible domain.
Next a policy maker has to decide which combinations of indices are preferable. In
real multidimensional situations it is not that easy and an objective function (= utility
function) which takes greater values at better alternatives is defined.
Figure 1.1 depicts the map of the utility hill with indifference curves, along which
the preference remains constant. They are level curves of the objective function y =
−(U − 10)(I − 10). Its values lie in the third dimension beyond the plane, determining
the relief of the utility hill.
Finally the optimal solution, that is, the preferable combination of unemployment and
inflation rates, is found as the highest utility point along the Phillips curve from the
following optimization problem
minimize (U − 10)(I − 10) ⇐⇒ maximize − (U − 10)(I − 10)
subject to U + I = 12
0 ≤ U ≤ 10
0 ≤ I ≤ 10 .
In Figure 1.1 the optimum is attained at the point (6%, 6%) where the constraint line
is tangential to an indifference curve. To attain the optimum, the Central Bank has
to cause the 6%-inflation by appropriately adjusting the interest rate (for this purpose
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another econometric estimation may be needed).
Summing up what has been said, the objective function represents the desired, the con-
straint derived from the econometric model represents the feasible, and their interaction
results in the optimal decision. Thus econometric equations can be regarded as constraints
in optimization models. In a sense, optimization adds an active element, the choice, to
descriptive econometric models, making the next step in controlling the situation.
1.4 Econometric decision models
Just this philosophy was developed by R. Frisch and J. Tinbergen. For the first time,
the term ‘decision model’ (= econometric optimization model) was used in Frisch’s work
for the United Nations Economic and Employment Commission in 1949 (Bjerkholt and
Strøm 2002). This work was published as late as in 1955 and the idea of decision models
became popular owing to Tinbergen’s On the Theory of Economic Policy (1952) where
he acknowledged Frisch’s priority. Both Tinbergen and Frisch strongly promoted the
so-called quadratic-linear approach with a quadratic objective function maximized or
minimized subject to linear constraints.
The bottle-neck was the objective function, and Frisch (1957, 1971) suggested the
Multiplex Method to construct it from interviews. In the mid-1950s he conducted “well
planned interviews” with the Norwegian Minister of Finance Trygve Bratteli who became
Prime Minister for the Labour Party in the early 1970s. Later this approach was ten-
tatively used by Van Eijk and Sandee (1959), Chossudovsky (1972a–b), Van der Geest
(1977), Merkies and Nijman (1983), Van Daal and Merkies (1984), Merkies and Hofkies
(1991), Hu¨sges and Gruber (1991), and Medelin, Aspedale and Pachio (1994).
Frisch intended objective functions for decision models, but these plans had few suc-
cessors. Frisch’s ideas were not really elaborated but only discussed by Hallet and Rees
(1983), Rustem and Velupillai (1984), Hughes Hallet (1991), and some others. In par-
ticular, Oswald (1985) explained perspectives of using econometric decision models for
the wage formation. Recovering objective functions of trade union leaders and of leaders
of employer’s associations were supposed to imply the tradeoff between wage level and
unemployment.
Tinbergen payed a considerable attention to econometric decision models but was
inclined to derive the objective function from the formulation of the problem rather than
from interviews (Kol and de Wolf 1993). Many of his objective functions are linear,
but some are quadratic. It is the case of the model with fixed targets (= the ideal
combination of variables), where the distance to the given point is minimized (Tinbergen
1956).1 Tinbergen’s approach was further developed by Theil (1964), Fox et al. (1966),
Chow (1975) and other leading economists.
Tinbergen’s view at econometric decision models was ‘more objectivistic’ than that
of Frisch. Deriving objective functions from sources other than interviews looked more
impartial and ‘scientific’. Sharing this standpoint, several authors revealed objective func-
1Strictly speaking, it is difficult to avoid subjectivity even here. The distance in the econometric
space is ill-defined. Axes are measured in different units like percent, absolute figures, dollar, or EURO.
Determining their substitution rates brings the problem back to Frisch’s interviews.
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tions from panel data, in particular from tradeoffs observed. These studies are however
not quite relevant to proper decision models, since they are not aimed at finding decisions
but operate on the ones already made (like consumer choices). Moreover, a ‘decision’ is
regarded as a kind of equilibrium-based optimization which is not exactly the subject of
decision models. For a survey of related works see Dantzing at al. (1989a–b) where the
objective function of the U.S. economy is constructed.
Tinbergen and his successors often considered abstract objective functions for analyt-
ical purposes, without numerically determining their coefficients. The linear-quadratic
decision model which seemed quite operational was rather a theoretical framework. Per-
sistent Frisch’s efforts to develop methods for constructing objective functions were not
more than practice-oriented. As concluded by Bjerkholt and Strøm (2002), “Frisch left
this field of interest with work undone”.
Gruber (2002) remembers that in 1965, after 35 years of existence of the Econometric
Society and 16 years after the idea of econometric decision models had been introduced,
he found no operational method for constructing objective functions. In both American
and German dissertations Gruber (1965, 1967) had to use a heuristic quadratic objective
function with no cross-products and roughly estimated coefficients of squared variables.
In subsequent years the situation did not improve much (Gruber 1979) and he tried
to animate studies in econometric decision models by having organized four international
conferences (Gruber 1983, 1991; Tangian and Gruber 1997, 2002). Interesting experiments
were reported by Merkies; for the self-survey see Merkies (2002). A special method for
constructing quadratic and additive objective functions was developed by Tangian (2001–
2003a) and applied by Hilles and Tangian (2002), Schwarm (2002), and Teibach (2002).
Dealing with econometric decision models turned out to be more complex than initially
expected. Compared with purely econometric models, they include an additional element,
the objective function, and result in optimization problems to be solved. Unlike statistical
methods applicable to almost all data sets, optimization techniques are not that universal.
Respectively, econometric models are generally solvable but econometric decision models
are not.
This makes building a decision model a kind of art. It assumes the knowledge of the
subject domain. Selecting important factors, sorting out secondary ones, and formalizing
ill-defined notions, relations, and preferences by variables, equalities, inequalities, and
objective functions requires intuition and inventiveness. Configuring sophisticated opti-
mization methods into a consistent model needs mathematical skills. Finally, the whole
construct must be mathematically manageable and computable.
These claims explain why purely econometric models prevail over their optimization
extensions. Another cause is the situation in mathematics and computer science. Statis-
tics as a mathematical discipline was well developed before the invention of computers,
and statistical packages became available already in the 1960–1970s. Optimization, or
mathematical programming, was developed mainly after the Second World War just to
meet new technical endeavors. Accordingly, optimization software was delayed, especially
in the user-friendliness, by at least 20 years.
The last but not least cause of disregarding decision models in economics is the speci-
ficity of scholarly work itself. Statistics meets its habitual tasks of description, classi-
fication, analysis, and systematization. Decision making belongs to the competence of
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engineers, managers, and policy makers. So a psychological factor is also present.
Summing up what has been said, econometric decision models are still in their infancy.
Due to a delay in their development and other difficulties, they are much less used by
scholars than purely econometric models. The latter are often sufficient as explaining the
dependence of economic variables and thereby restricting the choice of economic policies
to feasible ones. However, the policies restricted that way are still too numerous to make
the final selection. For this purpose an operational objective function, which distinguishes
a decision model, is required.
In particularly it is the case of active labor market policies. Econometric studies
analyze their effects: short- and long-term employment, labor demand, migration, future
prospects of participants, etc. It is recognized that labor market policies are implemented
administratively with little use of optimization methods. Therefore, there is a hope that
developing dedicated decision models can optimize them and improve their performance.
1.5 About the given work
Reducing disparities among regions within European countries is the aim of the European
and national structural policy. In particular, a European grant contributes to the German
governmental program for equalizing regional unemployment. The goal is to bring it down
to the national average by creating new and/or by safeguarding existing jobs (Deutscher
Bundestag 2002, Tetsch et al. 1996). It should be emphasized that this grant is given to
equalize rather than to decrease the regional unemployment. The latter goal is subsidized
from other sources.
The equalization of unemployment resembles the stabilization of an airplane. The
stabilizer consumes some energy of the engine but is necessary to provide a safe flight. The
equalization of unemployment takes some resources from the main budget of active labor
market policies but prevents from structural disproportions. A limited grant naturally
results in a trend to subsidize in the first turn the jobs which need less subsidies rather
than the jobs which are ‘expensive’ for grant-givers. Since the ‘price’ of a job depends of
prevailing regional industries and services, some regions are little supported and others, on
the contrary, get too much aid. This decreases the average unemployment but increases
the disparity among regions.
At present Germany is divided into 271 labor market regions, 204 in West Germany,
and 67 in East Germany. The European employment policy restricts the regions to be
supported to 23.4% of the total population (Crome and Schwengler 2000, Hassold and
Jung 2000). Taking into account economic difficulties in East Germany, all its regions are
eligible, and the budget is separate for West and East Germany. During the control period
2000–2002 all eligible regions received about six billion EURO; West Germany received
617.8 Mio, about 1/10, and East Germany — 5360.1 Mio, 9/10 of the total.
In the given paper we develop an econometric decision model for redistributing the
aid among eligible regions in East and West Germany. The optimization is performed
to equalize regional unemployment, according to the goals of European and national
structural policies.
The modelling falls into the following steps.
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• Collecting data on regional unemployment in Germany
These data are available from Bundesamt fu¨r Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle
(2003), Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit (2003a), and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003).
• Explaining regional unemployment rates as functions in regional subsidies
Effects of active labor market policies on the regional unemployment have been
outlined in Section 1.2. As revealed by Hagen (2003) and several other authors, the
regional unemployment rates depend on the subsidies granted to the regions. For
our study, we use the simplest linear estimation directly derived from the available
statistical figures.
• Operationalizing the criterion of regional unemployment disparity
For this purpose, the least variance of regional unemployment rates is appropri-
ate. The variance measures the mean deviation of regional rates from the national
average, exactly what is required to minimize.
The criterion of least variance, not always explicitly, is used in models of market
stabilization (Gruber 1965, 1967), general economic stabilization (Pindyck 1973,
Friedman 1975), and optimal control (Chow 1975, Blanchard and Fischer 1989).
For using objective functions in budget distribution problems see Fandel and Gal
(2001) and Tangian (2003b).
• Expressing the regional unemployment disparity in regional subsidies
To express the variance V = V(Regional unemployment rates) as a function of re-
gional subsidies it suffices to replace the Regional unemployment rates in V by the
linear functions estimated at the previous step:
Regional unemployment rate = A · Regional subsidy + B → V .
Since the variance is a quadratic function in its entries, this linear substitution
results in a quadratic objective function in regional subsidies.
• Building a decision model
It remains to impose the total budget constraint and to restrict the aid to the
eligible regions. The problem operationalized that way is linear-quadratic, with the
quadratic variance function minimized subject to a linear budget constraint and
eligibility restrictions.
• Solving the optimization problem
The linearly restricted quadratic programming problem is implemented in a com-
puter program written in the MATLAB programming environment. For larger ap-
plications it might be possible to use the fast algorithm (Tangian 2001).
• Analyzing the optimal solution
The equalization is performed for West Germany and East Germany with separate
budgets. The figures computed are compared with the actual statistical data for
2000–2002. They show how to improve the distribution of European and national
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grants among the eligible regions. In West Germany, the variance (of regional
unemployment) can be reduced from the actual 4.40 to 3.50 with a simultaneous
decrease in the average regional unemployment from the actual 7.45% to 7.28%. In
East Germany all regions are eligible, implying no administrative constraints and
a high optimization flexibility. It enables an almost perfect equalization of regional
indices with the variance 0.28 against the actual 3.12.
If the total budget were not separated for East and West Germany, the overall
equalization could be much better, with the variance 17.32 against the actual 27.29.
Moreover, the average regional unemployment also decreases to 9.49% against the
actual 10.11%. It would however require to redistribute the aid to East Germany
and reduce the budget of West Germany to 110 Mio EURO against the actual 617
Mio.
Chapter 2, “Model”, contains rigorous assumptions and mathematical propositions.
The ‘motor’ of the model is the objective function, which operationalizes the idea of
equalization. As often happens in new applications, an additional theoretical development
is needed. In our case, we introduce the variance operator which reduces computing the
variance to a vector/matrix multiplication, separates linear and quadratic operations, and
thereby makes the optimization problem solvable.
Chapter 3, “Results”, explains the model output represented by figures and tables.
Then we comment on the recommended redistribution of the budget among the eligible
regions. Next we suggest a tool for predicting the equalization effects of subsidies of
variable size, which may be useful while planning a future equalization policy. Finally, we
estimate the economic gain from using the model.
Under the model assumptions, the actual results of the equalizing policy could be at-
tained by half the budget granted. These underused possibilities explain the low efficiency
of active labor market policies reported in empirical studies.
The last chapter “Conclusion” outlines perspectives for further developments and re-
capitulates the main results of the paper.
Chapter 2
Model
2.1 Idea
Imagine 20 pipes of different profiles with different levels of water. Imagine that we have
to refill some ‘eligible’ pipes with totally 10 liter water to the end of equalizing the levels.
Since some pipes are larger than others, the first question to be answered is: How fast
can every pipe be refilled, i.e., which amount of water does increase its level by 1 cm?
This analogy helps to understand our task. The pipes are regions, the water levels
are regional unemployment rates, and water is the subsidies given to regions which are
transformed into jobs and change the unemployment rate.
An essential assumption here is the linear dependence of the regional unemployment
on the number of subsidized jobs. In reality it is not that simple, but such an assumption
literally meets the formulation of the problem: The grants are expected to have an effect,
otherwise giving grants has no sense. The linearity is also not very restrictive. Indeed, the
Taylor expansion of a process contains constant, linear, quadratic, and other constituents
of higher degrees with vanishing role. Consequently, the first-order approximation can be
always assumed linear.
2.2 Data
To be specific, consider West Germany with 204 labor market regions indexed by
r = 1, . . . , 204 .
The same model will be applied to East Germany and to the whole of Germany.
Introduce vector notation for input data.
u the column 204-vector of regional numbers of unemployed in 2002,
u the column 204-vector of regional unemployment rate in 2002, in %,
a the column 204-vector of aid to regions from national German and European sources
in the control period 2000–2002, in Mio EURO,
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j the column 204-vector of jobs subsidized in 2000–2002, in the number of jobs; if the
rth region is not subsidized, the corresponding coordinate jr = 0.
2.3 Unemployment as a function of subsidies
For each eligible region r express the regional unemployment rate yr as a linear func-
tion of grant amount xr, which we rewrite in an equivalent form better adaptable for
interpretation:
yr = Ar + Br · xr
= nr︸︷︷︸
net
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
− 1pr︸︷︷︸
‘price’ to
reduce
unem-
ployment
by 1%
· xr︸︷︷︸
grant
amount
.
The regional net unemployment (with no aid) is certainly a function of numerous variables.
However, in our model all these variables are ‘passive’, since we have no influence on them
and they remain constant. Respectively, they are ‘packed’ together into the constant term
nr = Ar.
Now we make some intermediate estimations. From the given data, one can compute
successively the following vectors.
n the column 204-vector of net unemployment rates in 2002 (with no aid). For this
purpose we add the jobs subsidized to the number of unemployed, and then pro-
portionally derive the net unemployment rate:
n = (u + j). ∗ u./u (recall u 6= u) , (2.1)
where .∗ and ./ are element-by-element multiplication and division of vectors.
Our estimate assumes that those who got jobs due to the governmental subsidies
would otherwise remain unemployed. In reality unemployed can find jobs them-
selves, migrate, get retired, etc. If necessary, a comprehensive explanation of net
unemployment can be substituted into the model.
e the column 204-vector of aid effect (= the decrement in regional unemployment rates)
e = n− u ,
p the column 204-vector of ‘prices’ (= amount of aid required, in Mio EURO) for a
1%-decrement of regional unemployment rates
p = a./e (for non-eligible regions put pr = 0) .
From here we obtain the equation for the regional unemployment rate y as a function of
the aid x to the regions:
y = n− diagonalize(p.−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= Q
x , (2.2)
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where Q is the diagonal (204×204)-matrix with the diagonal elements obtained from the
vector p by inverting its non-zero coordinates pr 6= 0 →
1
pr
.
If statistical data were available for several control periods then equation (2.2) could
be estimated econometrically more accurately.
2.4 Index of unemployment disparity
As already mentioned, the index of regional unemployment disparity is defined as the
variance of regional unemployment rates. Its computing is convenient in a vector-matrix
form.
Theorem 1 (Variance operator)
Consider a vector of m observations y = (y1, . . . , ym). Then their variance
Vy =
1
m− 1
m∑
r=1
(
yr −
1
m
m∑
s=1
ys
)2
=
1
m− 1
‖V y‖2 , (2.3)
where the variance operator V is the (m×m)-matrix
V =


1− 1
m
− 1
m
. . . − 1
m
− 1
m
− 1
m
1− 1
m
. . . − 1
m
− 1
m
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
− 1
m
− 1
m
. . . − 1
m
1− 1
m

 =


1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 0 1

− 1m .
Obviously, to minimize the variance, it suffices to minimize ‖V y‖2.
2.5 Equalization of regional unemployment
Substituting (2.2) into (2.3), express the regional unemployment disparity as a function
of regional subsidies:
1
204− 1
‖V y‖2 =
1
203
‖V n− V Qx‖2 .
We have to take into account that the total budget is fixed, subsidies cannot be negative,
and not all regions are eligible to receive them. Thus, the task of equalizing the regional
unemployment is reduced to the linearly constrained quadratic optimization problem.
Theorem 2 (Equalization of regional unemployment)
The regional unemployment disparity is minimal if the 204-vector of regional subsidies
x = {xr} is a solution to the linearly constrained quadratic optimization problem
minimize ‖V Qx− V n‖2 (2.4)
subject to
∑
r
xr = A = sum(a) (the total aid granted)
xr ≥ 0 for all regions r
xrn = 0 for non-eligible regions rn ,
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where the (204 × 204)-matrices V ,Q and 204-vector n are defined in previous sections.
The predicted equalized regional unemployment rates, average unemployment, and vari-
ance are respectively
y = n−Qx (2.5)
y =
sum(y)
204
Vy =
1
203
‖V y‖2 .
The results computed with this model are discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 3
Results
3.1 Overview
The model is implemented in the MATLAB programming language, Version 6, with the
Optimization Toolbox, Version 2. The program performs three runs of the model from
Theorem 2, separately for West and East Germany with their separate budgets, and then
tentatively for the whole of Germany with a joint budget. Each run outputs a figure with
an overview of the equalization stages; see Figures 3.1–3.3.
The detailed results of all the three runs are compiled in Table 3.1.
1. Figure 3.1 contains four graphs with their horizontal axes displaying West German
region numbers 1–204 (their names are listed in Table 3.1), and vertical axes showing
the unemployment rate. The regional unemployment rates are depicted by circles
which stem from the average unemployment level, thereby visualizing the standard
deviation. Exact numbers are given in Table 3.1.
(a) The top graph shows the initial situation in 2000 with the average regional
unemployment 7.24% and variance 5.15.
(b) The next graph depicts the actual situation in 2002 (= vector u) with the
average regional unemployment 7.45% and variance 4.40. Compared with 2000,
the situation got worse.
(c) The third graph shows that the subsidies improved the situation. It displays
the net regional unemployment estimated (= vector n), as it could be without
subsidies. The average regional unemployment is then 7.80% and the variance
6.78.
(d) The bottom graph represents the indices equalized. Compared with the actual
situation in graph (b), the average unemployment and especially the variance,
which is the index optimized, are brought down to 7.28% and 3.50, respectively.
2. Figure 3.2 results from processing East German regions numbered 205–271, also
listed by name in Table 3.1. In 2000–2002 the unemployment increased in spite of
subsidies (17.68% in 2000 and 18.21% in 2002), which also could not equalize it (the
variance 8.91 in 2000 and 9.76 in 2002). Moreover, the natural self-regulation could
25
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(a)  Unemployment 2000:  Average=7.24,  Variance=5.15
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(b)   Actual unemployment 2002:  Average=7.45,  Variance=4.40
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(c)  Net unemployment 2002 (with no aid): Average=7.80,  Variance=6.78
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(d)  Equalized unemployment 2002: Average=7.28,  Variance=3.50
Figure 3.1: Equalization of unemployment in West Germany (regions 1–204)
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(a)  Unemployment 2000:  Average=17.68,  Variance=8.91
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(b)   Actual unemployment 2002:  Average=18.21,  Variance=9.76
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(c)  Net unemployment 2002 (with no aid): Average=22.93,  Variance=9.17
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(d)  Equalized unemployment 2002: Average=18.21,  Variance=0.28
Figure 3.2: Equalization of unemployment in East Germany (regions 205–271)
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(a)  Unemployment 2000:  Average=9.82,  Variance=26.42
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(b)   Actual unemployment 2002:  Average=10.11,  Variance=27.29
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(c)  Net unemployment 2002 (with no aid): Average=11.54,  Variance=50.08
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(d)  Equalized unemployment 2002: Average=9.49,  Variance=17.32
Figure 3.3: Equalization of unemployment in the whole of Germany (regions 1–271)
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equalize it even better: The variance of the net unemployment 2002 in graph (c) is
9.17. So, the first aim of the subsidies was not attained.
The bottom graph in Figure 3.2 shows the regional unemployment rates of East
Germany almost perfectly equalized with the variance reduced to 0.28. Since all East
German regions are eligible to receive subsidies, the equalization for East Germany
is more flexible than in case of West Germany. The subsidies are thereby channelled
to reduce the variance rather than the average unemployment, which holds at the
actual level 18.21.
3. Figure 3.3 illustrates what would be possible if the budgets of West and East Ger-
many were not separate. The average unemployment could be reduced from the
actual 10.11% to 9.49% and the variance from 27.29 to 17.42. This would require to
redistribute 507.406 Mio EUR from West to East: Instead of 617 Mio EURO West
Germany receives 110 Mio, or only 1.8% of the mutual budget.
3.2 Details
Table 3.1 with the program detailed output contains five vertical sections.
1. The first section displays the labor market regions and their numbers. As already
mentioned, West German regions have numbers 1–204, and East German regions
have numbers 205–271.
2. Section Data has six columns. The first two columns display the regional unem-
ployment for the year 2000, in absolute figures and in %. These data are not used
in computing but are important as the initial state of the control period.
Next columns are vectors u,u,a, j of unemployment in 2002, the granted aid in
2000–2002, and the subsidized jobs. Blank spaces mean that the region is not
eligible to receive subsidies, and is not processed by the model.
3. The next section Econometric estimation contains three columns. Two columns
contain coefficients of equation (2.2). They are vector n, the net unemployment,
which would occur with no aid, and vector p, the ‘price’ which the grant-givers
should pay to reduce the regional unemployment by 1%.
The last column of the section, “Aid per one subsidized job”, is auxiliary. It shows
how ‘expensive’ is one job for the grant-givers.
4. Section Separate optimization contains two parts one upon another. The upper part
in rows 1–204 displays the optimization output for West Germany, and the bottom
section in rows 205–271 concerns East Germany, processed separately.
Column “Redistribution of aid” displays the vector x−a, how the actual aid should
be changed with regard to the solution x of the problem (2.4). A negative number
means that the region should give the subsidy or its fraction back; a positive number
means an additional grant.
Column “Equalized unemployment rate 2002” shows the vector y obtained from
(2.6). This column is illustrated by the bottom graphs in Figures 3.1–3.3.
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Table 3.1: Equalization of unemployment
Nr. Labour market region Data Econometric estimation Separate equalization Joint equalization
Unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2000
Unem-
ployed
2000
u
Unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
u
Unem-
ployed
2002
a
Gran-
ted
aid
j
Subsi-
dized
jobs
n
Net
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
with no
aid
p
Aid
needed
to
reduce
unem-
ploy-
ment
by 1%
Aid per
one
subsi-
dized
job
x− a
Redis-
tribu-
tion of
aid
y
Equal-
ized
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
y − u
Incre-
ment in
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
Incre-
ment in
unem-
ployed
2002
x− a
Redis-
tribu-
tion of
aid
y
Equal-
ized
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
y − u
Incre-
ment in
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
Incre-
ment in
unem-
ployed
2002
% Number % Number Mio EUR Number % Mio EUR EUR Mio EUR % % Number Mio EUR % % Number
1 Husum 7.4 5724 8.0 6409 1.460 183 8.23 6.391 7978 −1.460 8.23 0.23 183 −1.460 8.23 0.23 183
2 Heide 9.0 5628 9.2 6030 9.20 9.20 9.20
3 Itzehoe 8.5 5530 9.3 6263 9.30 9.30 9.30
4 Flensburg 8.7 11268 9.1 12318 7.050 2020 10.59 4.724 3490 4.689 8.11 −0.99 −1343 −7.050 10.59 1.49 2020
5 Lu¨beck 10.8 21477 10.7 21552 9.900 2727 12.05 7.312 3630 15.632 8.56 −2.14 −4306 −9.900 12.05 1.35 2727
6 Kiel 9.3 31794 9.4 33275 0.930 104 9.43 31.655 8942 −0.930 9.43 0.03 104 −0.930 9.43 0.03 104
7 Ratzeburg 7.6 6524 7.8 7089 7.80 7.80 7.80
8 Hamburg 8.1 108313 8.3 115298 8.30 8.30 8.30
9 Braunschweig 10.4 25198 10.3 25748 7.440 1844 11.04 10.086 4035 12.612 9.05 −1.25 −3126 −7.440 11.04 0.74 1844
10 Salzgitter 12.9 6794 12.0 6320 1.900 391 12.74 2.559 4859 10.935 7.73 −4.27 −2250 4.104 10.40 −1.60 −845
11 Wolfsburg 10.0 13791 9.0 13001 9.00 9.00 9.00
12 Go¨ttingen 11.6 14421 11.1 14239 21.080 4393 14.52 6.156 4799 16.872 8.36 −2.74 −3516 −3.492 11.67 0.57 728
13 Goslar 12.0 8859 11.4 8412 11.400 1435 13.34 5.862 7944 18.129 8.31 −3.09 −2282 −0.959 11.56 0.16 121
14 Helmstedt 11.8 5491 11.3 5398 3.730 821 13.02 2.170 4543 7.902 7.66 −3.64 −1739 2.260 10.26 −1.04 −497
15 Einbeck 10.6 7910 10.9 8317 6.770 1587 12.98 3.255 4266 9.930 7.85 −3.05 −2328 0.839 10.64 −0.26 −197
16 Osterode 12.6 5143 12.8 5288 18.020 2601 19.10 2.862 6928 14.367 7.78 −5.02 −2074 6.573 10.50 −2.30 −949
17 Hannover 9.8 53271 10.1 57904 10.10 10.10 10.10
18 Sulingen 6.3 6471 6.6 6986 6.60 6.60 6.60
19 Hameln 11.3 8838 11.6 9315 8.260 372 12.06 17.830 22204 21.215 10.41 −1.19 −955 −8.260 12.06 0.46 372
20 Hildesheim 8.8 12234 8.7 12539 7.700 740 9.21 14.997 10405 −7.700 9.21 0.51 740 −7.700 9.21 0.51 740
21 Holzminden 9.6 3631 10.7 4071 1.360 50 10.83 10.349 27200 16.602 9.10 −1.60 −610 −1.360 10.83 0.13 50
22 Nienburg 7.3 4304 7.8 4777 1.280 120 8.00 6.533 10667 −1.280 8.00 0.20 120 −1.280 8.00 0.20 120
23 Stadthagen 8.4 6502 9.0 7184 9.00 9.00 9.00
24 Celle 10.3 8671 9.6 8389 15.940 1628 11.46 8.556 9791 7.009 8.78 −0.82 −716 −15.940 11.46 1.86 1628
25 Lu¨neburg 9.7 7886 10.3 8729 3.540 369 10.74 8.130 9593 12.960 8.71 −1.59 −1351 −3.540 10.74 0.44 369
26 Zeven 6.5 5170 6.8 5642 6.80 6.80 6.80
27 Soltau 7.7 5145 8.0 5527 2.180 330 8.48 4.564 6606 −0.362 8.08 0.08 55 −2.180 8.48 0.48 330
28 Stade 6.9 6524 7.0 6734 7.00 7.00 7.00
29 Uelzen 11.6 8125 11.5 8230 5.320 759 12.56 5.016 7009 16.760 8.16 −3.34 −2391 1.181 11.26 −0.24 −168
30 Verden 6.2 4099 6.0 4104 6.00 6.00 6.00
31 Emden 12.0 12511 11.2 12465 9.620 312 11.48 34.316 30833 −9.620 11.48 0.28 312 −9.620 11.48 0.28 312
32 Westerstede 8.0 4525 7.8 4762 4.570 146 8.04 19.110 31301 −4.570 8.04 0.24 146 −4.570 8.04 0.24 146
33 Oldenburg 9.5 12753 9.3 13054 2.920 628 9.75 6.527 4650 5.716 8.42 −0.88 −1229 −2.920 9.75 0.45 628
34 Osnabru¨ck 7.2 17761 7.6 19636 7.60 7.60 7.60
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Table 3.1: Equalization of unemployment (continued)
Nr. Labour market region Data Econometric estimation Separate equalization Joint equalization
Unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2000
Unem-
ployed
2000
u
Unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
u
Unem-
ployed
2002
a
Gran-
ted
aid
j
Subsi-
dized
jobs
n
Net
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
with no
aid
p
Aid
needed
to
reduce
unem-
ploy-
ment
by 1%
Aid per
one
subsi-
dized
job
x− a
Redis-
tribu-
tion of
aid
y
Equal-
ized
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
y − u
Incre-
ment in
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
Incre-
ment in
unem-
ployed
2002
x− a
Redis-
tribu-
tion of
aid
y
Equal-
ized
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
y − u
Incre-
ment in
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
Incre-
ment in
unem-
ployed
2002
% Number % Number Mio EUR Number % Mio EUR EUR Mio EUR % % Number Mio EUR % % Number
35 Wilhelmshaven 11.6 12718 11.2 12611 8.760 901 12.00 10.947 9723 21.885 9.20 −2.00 −2251 −8.760 12.00 0.80 901
36 Cloppenburg 7.5 5202 7.2 5322 13.990 1192 8.81 8.675 11737 −13.895 8.80 1.60 1184 −13.990 8.81 1.61 1192
37 Lingen 8.5 11638 7.8 11385 6.900 368 8.05 27.368 18750 −6.900 8.05 0.25 368 −6.900 8.05 0.25 368
38 Nordhorn 7.0 4144 7.8 4890 7.290 491 8.58 9.308 14847 −7.290 8.58 0.78 491 −7.290 8.58 0.78 491
39 Leer 11.0 7775 10.9 8160 9.990 581 11.68 12.872 17194 17.518 9.54 −1.36 −1019 −9.990 11.68 0.78 581
40 Vechta 5.5 3506 5.2 3572 5.20 5.20 5.20
41 Nordenham 9.4 4124 8.8 3973 10.370 504 9.92 9.289 20575 −1.018 8.91 0.11 49 −10.370 9.92 1.12 504
42 Bremen 11.5 40395 11.0 39753 6.090 464 11.13 47.433 13125 −6.090 11.13 0.13 464 −6.090 11.13 0.13 464
43 Bremerhaven 11.7 17720 11.9 18359 18.860 1746 13.03 16.665 10802 28.240 10.21 −1.69 −2614 −18.860 13.03 1.13 1746
44 He¨xter 7.7 5412 8.4 6109 8.40 8.40 8.40
45 Du¨sseldorf 7.9 60257 7.7 60234 7.70 7.70 7.70
46 Duisburg 11.3 62320 10.8 61568 48.660 3466 11.41 80.034 14039 −48.660 11.41 0.61 3466 −48.660 11.41 0.61 3466
47 Essen 10.7 38323 10.6 38770 10.60 10.60 10.60
48 Krefeld 11.0 12409 10.7 12200 0.090 6 10.71 17.103 15000 7.143 10.28 −0.42 −476 −0.090 10.71 0.01 6
49 Viersen 7.6 10900 7.7 11362 7.70 7.70 7.70
50 Mo¨nchengladbach 10.4 13325 11.0 14411 0.590 59 11.05 13.101 10000 18.613 9.58 −1.42 −1861 −0.590 11.05 0.05 59
51 Heinsberg 9.1 9817 8.8 10070 23.110 1946 10.50 13.590 11876 −11.756 9.67 0.87 990 −23.110 10.50 1.70 1946
52 Wuppertal 9.0 23393 9.5 25093 9.50 9.50 9.50
53 Schwelm 9.1 15245 8.5 14465 8.50 8.50 8.50
54 Remscheid 8.0 4880 8.5 5237 8.50 8.50 8.50
55 Kleve 7.9 11088 7.2 10763 7.20 7.20 7.20
56 Aachen 10.1 25710 9.6 25476 9.60 9.60 9.60
57 Ko¨ln 9.4 77411 9.3 80586 9.30 9.30 9.30
58 Leverkusen 9.6 7478 9.4 7449 9.40 9.40 9.40
59 Bonn 6.5 26724 6.8 29611 6.80 6.80 6.80
60 Du¨ren 8.1 9668 8.7 10929 8.70 8.70 8.70
61 Euskirchen 6.4 5434 7.2 6501 7.20 7.20 7.20
62 Gummersbach 8.3 11251 8.1 11498 8.10 8.10 8.10
63 Gelsenkirchen 13.3 73103 13.1 73939 21.870 2077 13.47 59.431 10530 −21.870 13.47 0.37 2077 −21.870 13.47 0.37 2077
64 Mu¨nster 6.5 23394 6.9 26603 6.90 6.90 6.90
65 Borken 6.3 10497 7.1 12621 7.10 7.10 7.10
66 Steinfurt 6.4 12881 6.6 14013 6.60 6.60 6.60
67 Bielefeld 9.2 26261 10.3 30106 10.30 10.30 10.30
68 Gu¨tersloh 6.6 11309 7.9 14237 7.90 7.90 7.90
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Table 3.1: Equalization of unemployment (continued)
Nr. Labour market region Data Econometric estimation Separate equalization Joint equalization
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ploy-
ment
rate
2000
Unem-
ployed
2000
u
Unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
u
Unem-
ployed
2002
a
Gran-
ted
aid
j
Subsi-
dized
jobs
n
Net
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
with no
aid
p
Aid
needed
to
reduce
unem-
ploy-
ment
by 1%
Aid per
one
subsi-
dized
job
x− a
Redis-
tribu-
tion of
aid
y
Equal-
ized
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
y − u
Incre-
ment in
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
Incre-
ment in
unem-
ployed
2002
x− a
Redis-
tribu-
tion of
aid
y
Equal-
ized
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
y − u
Incre-
ment in
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
2002
Incre-
ment in
unem-
ployed
2002
% Number % Number Mio EUR Number % Mio EUR EUR Mio EUR % % Number Mio EUR % % Number
69 Detmold 7.9 13579 9.7 17173 9.70 9.70 9.70
70 Minden 7.6 11670 8.6 13433 8.60 8.60 8.60
71 Paderborn 8.3 11335 8.8 12720 8.80 8.80 8.80
72 Bochum 11.4 20328 11.1 20229 11.10 11.10 11.10
73 Dortmund 12.6 68307 12.3 69006 87.710 7866 13.70 62.557 11151 −87.710 13.70 1.40 7866 −87.710 13.70 1.40 7866
74 Hagen 10.6 10537 10.8 10751 11.800 525 11.33 22.374 22476 −9.140 11.21 0.41 407 −11.800 11.33 0.53 525
75 Lu¨denscheid 7.8 17335 8.4 19061 8.40 8.40 8.40
76 Meschede 6.3 8647 7.2 10166 7.20 7.20 7.20
77 Siegen 7.1 9890 7.3 10444 7.30 7.30 7.30
78 Olpe 6.0 4137 6.2 4478 6.20 6.20 6.20
79 Soest 7.6 10965 8.6 12998 8.60 8.60 8.60
80 Korbach 7.4 5854 7.2 6020 4.810 672 8.00 5.985 7158 −4.810 8.00 0.80 672 −4.810 8.00 0.80 672
81 Kassel 11.5 24146 10.7 23151 26.280 2442 11.83 23.284 10762 −15.564 11.37 0.67 1446 −26.280 11.83 1.13 2442
82 Eschwege 11.8 6445 10.2 5725 10.530 2179 14.08 2.712 4832 6.634 7.75 −2.45 −1373 −0.679 10.45 0.25 141
83 Schwalm-Eder 9.2 8224 8.4 7913 15.590 1160 9.63 12.660 13440 −13.950 9.50 1.10 1038 −15.590 9.63 1.23 1160
84 Hersfeld 9.5 5715 7.9 4874 6.410 942 9.43 4.198 6805 −0.483 8.02 0.12 71 −6.410 9.43 1.53 942
85 Marburg 7.2 8448 6.7 8134 6.70 6.70 6.70
86 Lauterbach 7.8 4374 7.4 4345 3.240 449 8.16 4.237 7216 −2.635 8.02 0.62 365 −3.240 8.16 0.76 449
87 Fulda 7.3 7482 7.0 7531 7.00 7.00 7.00
88 Wetzlar 7.8 9902 7.6 10001 7.60 7.60 7.60
89 Gießen 8.3 10247 8.3 10682 8.30 8.30 8.30
90 Limburg 6.0 4907 6.4 5438 6.40 6.40 6.40
91 Wiesbaden 6.5 14788 6.7 15716 6.70 6.70 6.70
92 Frankfurt/Main 6.2 64646 6.1 66424 6.10 6.10 6.10
93 Hanau 6.9 14029 6.5 13708 6.50 6.50 6.50
94 Darmstadt 6.2 13145 6.1 13458 6.10 6.10 6.10
95 Erbach 6.4 3068 6.1 3019 6.10 6.10 6.10
96 Altenkirchen 6.6 4110 7.2 4778 7.20 7.20 7.20
97 Montabaur 5.5 5328 5.9 6049 5.90 5.90 5.90
98 Neuwied 6.8 5779 7.9 7004 7.90 7.90 7.90
99 Ahrweiler 5.8 3498 6.1 3839 6.10 6.10 6.10
100 Koblenz 6.7 14367 6.9 15425 6.90 6.90 6.90
101 Bad Kreuznach 8.2 6086 7.8 6192 1.030 81 7.90 10.095 12716 −1.030 7.90 0.10 81 −1.030 7.90 0.10 81
102 Idar-Oberstein 8.7 3638 8.9 3906 0.910 71 9.06 5.625 12817 3.567 8.27 −0.63 −278 −0.910 9.06 0.16 71
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Table 3.1: Equalization of unemployment (continued)
Nr. Labour market region Data Econometric estimation Separate equalization Joint equalization
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% Number % Number Mio EUR Number % Mio EUR EUR Mio EUR % % Number Mio EUR % % Number
103 Cochem 5.6 1716 5.1 1664 5.10 5.10 5.10
104 Simmern 7.2 3603 7.0 3721 7.00 7.00 7.00
105 Trier 7.9 8203 7.4 8075 7.40 7.40 7.40
106 Bernkastel-Wittlich 6.3 3396 6.2 3560 6.20 6.20 6.20
107 Daun 5.8 1678 6.2 1901 6.20 6.20 6.20
108 Bitburg 6.2 2485 5.8 2474 5.80 5.80 5.80
109 Kaiserslautern 9.5 16411 9.0 16077 8.500 786 9.44 19.318 10814 −8.500 9.44 0.44 786 −8.500 9.44 0.44 786
110 Landau 6.5 4722 6.5 4906 6.50 6.50 6.50
111 Mainz 6.1 11613 6.3 12520 6.30 6.30 6.30
112 Alzey-Worms 7.9 7775 7.6 7840 7.60 7.60 7.60
113 Pirmasens 10.2 9105 9.5 8652 15.090 1435 11.08 9.577 10516 5.170 8.96 −0.54 −492 −15.090 11.08 1.58 1435
114 Ludwigshafen 7.0 20256 7.2 21359 7.20 7.20 7.20
115 Germersheim 6.6 4031 6.6 4235 6.60 6.60 6.60
116 Merzig 8.1 3793 7.0 3396 10.940 1631 10.36 3.254 6708 −2.764 7.85 0.85 412 −10.940 10.36 3.36 1631
117 St. Wendel 6.4 2796 6.3 2871 6.30 6.30 6.30
118 Saarbru¨cken 10.9 35391 10.1 33523 25.500 4283 11.39 19.761 5954 −12.833 10.75 0.65 2155 −25.500 11.39 1.29 4283
119 Homburg/Saar 7.7 5598 7.6 5683 7.60 7.60 7.60
120 Stuttgart 4.9 58819 4.9 60637 4.90 4.90 4.90
121 Go¨ppingen 4.6 5977 4.8 6296 4.80 4.80 4.80
122 Heilbronn 5.5 12261 5.7 13091 5.70 5.70 5.70
123 Schwa¨bisch Hall 4.5 6649 5.3 8034 5.30 5.30 5.30
124 Tauberbischofsheim 5.1 3420 5.5 3817 5.50 5.50 5.50
125 Heidenheim 6.1 4038 6.4 4338 6.40 6.40 6.40
126 Aalen 5.8 8982 6.0 9576 6.00 6.00 6.00
127 Baden-Baden 5.0 6970 5.1 7356 5.10 5.10 5.10
128 Karlsruhe 5.7 19692 5.8 20960 5.80 5.80 5.80
129 Heidelberg 6.1 19466 5.9 19619 5.90 5.90 5.90
130 Mannheim 8.5 23577 8.2 23447 8.20 8.20 8.20
131 Mosbach 5.4 3819 5.7 4193 5.70 5.70 5.70
132 Pforzheim 5.7 8996 6.1 9817 6.10 6.10 6.10
133 Calw 4.0 3053 4.3 3478 4.30 4.30 4.30
134 Freudenstadt 4.1 2470 4.7 2963 4.70 4.70 4.70
135 Freiburg 5.8 16450 5.8 17540 5.80 5.80 5.80
136 Offenburg 4.8 9885 5.2 11139 5.20 5.20 5.20
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Table 3.1: Equalization of unemployment (continued)
Nr. Labour market region Data Econometric estimation Separate equalization Joint equalization
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137 Rottweil 4.3 3043 4.8 3485 4.80 4.80 4.80
138 Villingen-Schwenningen 4.7 4909 5.4 5866 5.40 5.40 5.40
139 Tuttlingen 4.9 3350 4.9 3435 4.90 4.90 4.90
140 Konstanz 6.3 8197 6.5 8824 6.50 6.50 6.50
141 Lo¨rrach 6.3 6790 5.5 6136 5.50 5.50 5.50
142 Waldshut 6.1 4977 5.2 4487 5.20 5.20 5.20
143 Reutlingen/Tu¨bingen 4.9 11809 4.9 12314 4.90 4.90 4.90
144 Balingen 5.6 5582 5.7 5790 5.70 5.70 5.70
145 Ulm 5.1 11841 5.7 13664 5.70 5.70 5.70
146 Biberach 3.9 3451 4.3 4033 4.30 4.30 4.30
147 Friedrichshafen 4.7 4561 5.0 5043 5.00 5.00 5.00
148 Ravensburg 4.1 5311 4.6 6196 4.60 4.60 4.60
149 Sigmaringen 5.9 3807 6.0 4047 6.00 6.00 6.00
150 Bad Reichenhall 5.1 2440 5.7 2738 5.70 5.70 5.70
151 Traunstein 4.3 3494 4.8 4071 4.80 4.80 4.80
152 Burghausen 5.6 2923 6.4 3461 6.40 6.40 6.40
153 Mu¨hldorf 5.2 2730 6.2 3377 6.20 6.20 6.20
154 Rosenheim 4.1 5816 4.7 6996 4.70 4.70 4.70
155 Bad To¨lz 3.8 3926 4.3 4606 4.30 4.30 4.30
156 Garmisch-Partenkirchen 3.8 1619 4.2 1832 4.20 4.20 4.20
157 Weilheim 3.6 2206 3.8 2461 3.80 3.80 3.80
158 Landsberg 3.5 1741 3.8 2004 3.80 3.80 3.80
159 Mu¨nchen 4.3 53287 4.8 63104 4.80 4.80 4.80
160 Ingolstadt 5.0 10773 5.3 11892 5.30 5.30 5.30
161 Kelheim-Mainburg 4.9 2673 5.0 2895 5.00 5.00 5.00
162 Landshut 4.5 4547 5.0 5357 5.00 5.00 5.00
163 Dingolfing 4.0 1867 4.2 2026 4.20 4.20 4.20
164 Eggenfelden/Pfarrkirchen 5.0 2899 5.7 3384 5.70 5.70 5.70
165 Passau 7.1 8130 7.6 8926 20.820 2870 10.04 8.520 7254 −10.006 8.77 1.17 1379 −20.820 10.04 2.44 2870
166 Freyung 6.7 2684 8.5 3441 2.650 862 10.63 1.245 3074 1.249 7.50 −1.00 −406 −1.782 9.93 1.43 580
167 Regen-Zwisel 6.0 2418 7.5 3113 4.940 783 9.39 2.619 6309 −0.622 7.74 0.24 99 −4.940 9.39 1.89 783
168 Deggendorf 6.0 3438 6.8 4060 6.80 6.80 6.80
169 Straubing 5.4 3750 6.0 4337 6.00 6.00 6.00
170 Cham 6.4 4088 7.0 4642 9.090 1812 9.73 3.327 5017 −2.868 7.86 0.86 572 −9.090 9.73 2.73 1812
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Table 3.1: Equalization of unemployment (continued)
Nr. Labour market region Data Econometric estimation Separate equalization Joint equalization
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171 Regensburg 6.4 9862 6.5 10374 6.50 6.50 6.50
172 Schwandorf 5.3 3816 6.0 4382 6.00 6.00 6.00
173 Amberg 7.2 5264 7.9 6014 7.90 7.90 7.90
174 Neumarkt 5.5 3417 6.0 3862 6.00 6.00 6.00
175 Weiden 6.4 4538 7.0 5189 7.00 7.00 7.00
176 Marktredwitz 8.3 6826 9.7 8044 11.150 3389 13.79 2.728 3290 5.302 7.76 −1.94 −1611 −2.063 10.46 0.76 627
177 Hof 8.9 7081 10.7 8547 11.910 2776 14.18 3.427 4290 9.666 7.88 −2.82 −2253 −0.010 10.70 0.00 2
178 Bayreuth 7.0 6485 8.6 8100 8.60 8.60 8.60
179 Bamberg 7.1 7494 7.2 8035 7.20 7.20 7.20
180 Kulmbach 8.0 3203 9.3 3771 9.30 9.30 9.30
181 Kronach 7.3 2921 8.3 3352 8.30 8.30 8.30
182 Coburg 7.5 5197 9.1 6319 9.10 9.10 9.10
183 Lichtenfels 6.0 2173 8.2 3005 8.20 8.20 8.20
184 Erlangen 5.8 10160 5.8 10516 5.80 5.80 5.80
185 Nu¨rnberg 7.4 39817 8.2 44664 8.20 8.20 8.20
186 Weißenburg-Gunzenhausen 5.2 2479 6.7 3255 6.70 6.70 6.70
187 Ansbach 5.2 5727 5.9 6657 5.90 5.90 5.90
188 Neustadt/Aisch 4.4 2210 5.3 2757 5.30 5.30 5.30
189 Kitzingen 4.6 2091 4.7 2235 4.70 4.70 4.70
190 Wu¨rzburg 5.3 7521 5.6 8283 5.60 5.60 5.60
191 Schweinfurt 7.7 6423 7.6 6584 7.60 7.60 7.60
192 Haßfurt 6.1 2695 6.4 2966 6.40 6.40 6.40
193 Bad Neustadt/Saale 7.7 3228 8.0 3476 8.00 8.00 8.00
194 Bad Kissingen 7.3 3918 7.6 4199 7.60 7.60 7.60
195 Lohr am Main 4.3 2951 4.7 3275 4.70 4.70 4.70
196 Aschaffenburg 5.7 11024 6.2 12448 6.20 6.20 6.20
197 Donauwo¨rth-No¨rdlingen 3.9 2517 3.8 2562 3.80 3.80 3.80
198 Dillingen 3.7 1748 3.9 1929 3.90 3.90 3.90
199 Gu¨nzburg 4.9 2983 5.8 3658 5.80 5.80 5.80
200 Augsburg 5.5 16765 6.4 20294 6.40 6.40 6.40
201 Memmingen 4.1 3703 5.1 4687 5.10 5.10 5.10
202 Kaufbeuren 4.3 3703 5.0 4441 5.00 5.00 5.00
203 Kempten 4.8 5141 5.6 6105 5.60 5.60 5.60
204 Lindau 3.7 1411 4.0 1553 4.00 4.00 4.00
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Table 3.1: Equalization of unemployment (continued)
Nr. Labour market region Data Econometric estimation Separate equalization Joint equalization
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205 Pasewalk 23.1 9733 25.6 10581 5.720 670 27.22 3.529 8537 26.040 18.22 −7.38 −3050 52.440 10.74 −14.86 −6142
206 Greifswald 18.8 16306 19.8 17010 51.090 2938 23.22 14.939 17389 22.907 18.27 −1.53 −1317 75.121 14.77 −5.03 −4320
207 Stralsund 20.2 18242 21.0 18776 35.560 1327 22.48 23.959 26797 64.615 18.30 −2.70 −2411 72.849 17.96 −3.04 −2719
208 Bergen 17.5 6883 19.1 7512 26.660 663 20.79 15.815 40211 13.124 18.27 −0.83 −326 63.559 15.08 −4.02 −1581
209 Neubrandenburg 20.8 27876 22.9 30451 61.020 3405 25.46 23.830 17921 109.555 18.30 −4.60 −6113 118.823 17.91 −4.99 −6630
210 Waren 19.2 7017 21.1 7822 39.600 2289 27.27 6.413 17300 18.393 18.23 −2.87 −1063 59.911 11.76 −9.34 −3463
211 Gu¨strow 18.9 10727 21.1 12015 35.670 1307 23.40 15.541 27292 43.995 18.27 −2.83 −1612 95.044 14.98 −6.12 −3483
212 Rostock 15.3 25500 16.7 27549 106.450 5362 19.95 32.750 19853 −53.669 18.34 1.64 2703 −106.450 19.95 3.25 5362
213 Wismar 16.4 13848 15.3 13111 53.110 2460 18.17 18.501 21589 −53.110 18.17 2.87 2460 −13.510 16.03 0.73 626
214 Schwerin 14.3 17580 13.1 15999 53.170 4573 16.84 14.200 11627 −53.170 16.84 3.74 4573 −20.026 14.51 1.41 1722
215 Parchim 17.1 9300 17.0 9450 11.720 1923 20.46 3.388 6095 −4.133 18.22 1.22 678 21.381 10.69 −6.31 −3508
216 Berlin 15.5 328077 16.6 366447 536.660 45658 18.67 259.469 11754 −536.660 18.67 2.07 45658 −536.660 18.67 2.07 45658
217 Brandenburg a.d. Havel 19.2 13688 20.1 14444 58.590 3789 25.37 11.112 15463 20.545 18.25 −1.85 −1329 74.239 13.42 −6.68 −4801
218 Belzig 12.5 5027 12.7 5868 6.830 722 14.26 4.371 9460 −6.830 14.26 1.56 722 7.271 11.04 −1.66 −769
219 Cottbus 17.5 30024 17.8 30624 78.380 4224 20.26 31.924 18556 −17.093 18.34 0.54 921 −78.380 20.26 2.46 4224
220 Eberswalde 16.7 6970 17.2 6385 16.730 1095 20.15 5.672 15279 −5.837 18.23 1.03 382 32.350 11.50 −5.70 −2117
221 Prenzlau 22.3 17491 22.7 17449 43.490 1744 24.97 19.168 24937 84.653 18.28 −4.42 −3395 123.324 16.27 −6.43 −4945
222 Finsterwalde 19.9 13448 20.8 13878 28.930 3387 25.88 5.699 8541 14.651 18.23 −2.57 −1715 52.967 11.51 −9.29 −6201
223 Frankfurt/Oder 16.9 29316 18.1 22322 67.330 3615 21.03 22.970 18625 −4.574 18.30 0.20 246 11.262 17.61 −0.49 −605
224 Luckenwalde 14.8 6065 14.1 5010 35.250 2454 21.01 5.104 14364 −21.063 18.23 4.13 1466 14.313 11.30 −2.80 −996
225 Neuruppin 17.5 14230 18.5 18839 61.830 2888 21.34 21.802 21409 4.482 18.29 −0.21 −209 28.410 17.20 −1.30 −1327
226 Perleberg 19.0 9314 19.6 9450 31.250 1886 23.51 7.989 16569 10.877 18.24 −1.36 −656 58.197 12.32 −7.28 −3512
227 Senftenberg 22.7 16967 22.8 16651 135.020 3936 28.19 25.052 34304 112.546 18.31 −4.49 −3281 111.589 18.35 −4.45 −3253
228 Salzwedel 16.0 8241 16.1 8266 50.530 1166 18.37 22.250 43336 −48.865 18.30 2.20 1128 −27.927 17.36 1.26 644
229 Stendal 20.7 14944 21.2 14805 140.010 1493 23.34 65.490 93778 178.697 18.47 −2.73 −1906 −140.010 23.34 2.14 1493
230 Burg 18.8 9783 17.5 8948 31.910 1337 20.11 12.203 23867 −9.220 18.26 0.76 386 45.095 13.80 −3.70 −1889
231 Magdeburg 17.6 40586 17.0 38540 100.850 3923 18.73 58.280 25707 −84.050 18.44 1.44 3269 −100.850 18.73 1.73 3923
232 Halberstadt 19.7 25986 18.3 23845 192.440 5039 22.17 49.762 38190 −5.358 18.41 0.11 140 −192.440 22.17 3.87 5039
233 Staßfurt 23.2 12150 23.0 11809 39.660 2020 26.93 10.081 19634 47.914 18.25 −4.75 −2440 100.257 13.05 −9.95 −5106
234 Scho¨nebeck 22.2 16503 20.9 15126 59.930 2347 24.14 18.480 25535 48.401 18.28 −2.62 −1895 90.127 16.02 −4.88 −3530
235 Dessau 20.9 24916 19.4 22623 67.480 2941 21.92 26.756 22945 29.044 18.31 −1.09 −1266 12.093 18.95 −0.45 −527
236 Wittenberg 19.8 13604 18.8 12531 45.980 2253 22.18 13.603 20408 7.329 18.26 −0.54 −359 61.222 14.30 −4.50 −3000
237 Sangerhausen 21.9 19389 23.1 19903 40.350 1724 25.10 20.166 23405 97.041 18.29 −4.81 −4146 130.699 16.62 −6.48 −5584
238 Halle 19.6 34424 19.8 33984 46.550 2787 21.42 28.668 16703 42.364 18.32 −1.48 −2536 5.060 19.62 −0.18 −303
239 Bitterfeld 22.6 12582 21.4 11416 193.890 2672 26.41 38.710 72564 117.565 18.36 −3.04 −1620 −68.614 23.17 1.77 946
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Table 3.1: Equalization of unemployment (continued)
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240 Naumburg 21.6 39399 21.7 38615 120.020 2417 23.06 88.364 49657 277.107 18.56 −3.14 −5580 −120.020 23.06 1.36 2417
241 Erfurt 16.3 24457 17.2 26120 133.440 7988 22.46 25.368 16705 −28.130 18.31 1.11 1684 −31.900 18.46 1.26 1910
242 Weimar 15.0 11650 16.1 12831 40.510 3734 20.79 8.646 10849 −18.513 18.24 2.14 1706 30.716 12.55 −3.55 −2831
243 Gera 16.9 20773 17.0 20690 61.980 5935 21.88 12.710 10443 −15.984 18.26 1.26 1531 38.337 13.98 −3.02 −3671
244 Jena 13.4 13386 13.2 13465 126.600 6997 20.06 18.457 18093 −93.776 18.28 5.08 5183 −51.951 16.01 2.81 2871
245 Suhl 13.3 8842 13.5 8935 71.520 5567 21.91 8.503 12847 −40.308 18.24 4.74 3138 8.530 12.50 −1.00 −664
246 Eichsfeld 12.5 7290 14.2 8350 50.490 4588 22.00 6.471 11005 −26.094 18.23 4.03 2371 15.668 11.78 −2.42 −1424
247 Nordhausen 18.3 9196 19.4 9659 38.030 2272 23.96 8.334 16739 9.668 18.24 −1.16 −578 58.028 12.44 −6.96 −3467
248 Eisenach 13.1 12947 12.8 12596 85.580 8957 21.90 9.402 9555 −51.188 18.24 5.44 5357 −0.138 12.81 0.01 14
249 Mu¨hlhausen 15.1 9138 16.3 9839 24.840 3386 21.91 4.428 7336 −8.520 18.22 1.92 1161 23.218 11.06 −5.24 −3165
250 Sondershausen 20.7 9908 22.2 10489 29.590 3017 28.59 4.634 9808 18.420 18.22 −3.98 −1878 51.300 11.13 −11.07 −5231
251 Meiningen 13.3 10081 13.7 10453 69.100 7660 23.74 6.883 9021 −31.207 18.23 4.53 3459 12.222 11.92 −1.78 −1355
252 Gotha 14.0 10850 13.8 10798 67.910 6048 21.53 8.786 11229 −39.024 18.24 4.44 3475 10.570 12.60 −1.20 −941
253 Arnstadt 17.2 10743 18.7 11801 61.560 4645 26.06 8.364 13253 3.847 18.24 −0.46 −290 52.292 12.45 −6.25 −3946
254 Sonneberg 10.1 3647 11.1 4012 47.810 3494 20.77 4.946 13683 −35.244 18.23 7.13 2576 −0.691 11.24 0.14 50
255 Saalfeld 15.7 10586 16.0 10792 32.560 4126 22.12 5.323 7891 −11.857 18.23 2.23 1503 24.629 11.37 −4.63 −3121
256 Po¨ 14.0 7248 15.3 8005 31.650 4573 24.04 3.621 6921 −10.576 18.22 2.92 1528 16.398 10.77 −4.53 −2369
257 Altenburg 20.4 11926 21.6 12443 38.110 3894 28.36 5.638 9787 19.006 18.23 −3.37 −1942 57.031 11.48 −10.12 −5827
258 Leipzig 17.6 69140 18.6 73167 262.640 12629 21.81 81.808 20797 5.116 18.54 −0.06 −246 −262.640 21.81 3.21 12629
259 Torgau/Oschatz 18.5 17278 18.2 17025 66.870 6298 24.93 9.932 10618 −0.460 18.25 0.05 43 51.627 13.00 −5.20 −4862
260 Grimma 17.2 11890 16.2 11490 23.570 2052 19.09 8.147 11486 −16.612 18.24 2.04 1446 31.194 12.37 −3.83 −2716
261 Freiberg 16.3 20643 17.3 22033 175.140 14095 28.37 15.825 12426 −15.354 18.27 0.97 1236 35.058 15.08 −2.22 −2821
262 Chemnitz 16.7 46713 17.4 47897 142.860 18243 24.03 21.556 7831 −19.259 18.29 0.89 2459 6.247 17.11 −0.29 −798
263 Annaberg 17.2 28002 18.0 29600 189.870 16647 28.12 18.756 11406 −5.291 18.28 0.28 464 35.252 16.12 −1.88 −3091
264 Zwickau 18.0 22081 18.3 22399 72.440 5551 22.84 15.973 13050 0.466 18.27 −0.03 −36 50.524 15.14 −3.16 −3872
265 Plauen 14.1 19895 16.0 22494 116.770 13412 25.54 12.240 8706 −27.610 18.26 2.26 3171 26.712 13.82 −2.18 −3068
266 Dresden 14.8 48798 14.9 49409 238.700 15272 19.51 51.829 15630 −182.234 18.42 3.52 11659 −238.700 19.51 4.61 15272
267 Riesa 18.7 11901 19.3 12177 42.110 3040 24.12 8.740 13852 9.251 18.24 −1.06 −668 58.726 12.58 −6.72 −4240
268 Pirna 15.5 22002 16.8 23811 71.990 9567 23.55 10.665 7525 −15.457 18.25 1.45 2054 37.743 13.26 −3.54 −5016
269 Bautzen 18.7 35672 19.7 37327 136.510 10480 25.23 24.681 13026 34.403 18.31 −1.39 −2641 36.664 18.21 −1.49 −2815
270 Go¨rlitz 21.1 18173 22.6 19159 32.040 2464 25.51 11.023 13003 47.943 18.25 −4.35 −3687 101.551 13.39 −9.21 −7810
271 Lo¨bau-Zittau 20.4 15727 22.5 16899 67.650 3822 27.59 13.294 17700 56.367 18.26 −4.24 −3185 110.471 14.19 −8.31 −6241
Variance (West) 5.15 4.40 6.78 3.50
Variance (East) 8.91 9.76 9.17 0.28
Variance (Germany) 26.42 27.29 50.08 17.32
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Column “Increment in unemployment rate” displays vector y − u, the predicted
change of the actual unemployment rate after the redistribution of subsidies.
These rate increments converted from percent to the absolute number of unemployed
are given in the auxiliary column “Increment in unemployed”.
5. The last section, Joint optimization displays the results of unemployment equaliza-
tion for East and West Germany processed jointly. The columns of this sections are
the same as of Section Separate equalization.
6. Three bottom lines of Table 3.1 show the variance of the regional unemployment
rates. These indices appear in graph titles.
3.3 Redistribution of aid
The redistribution of aid for attaining the optimal equalization of unemployment is illus-
trated by Figure 3.4 It depicts Table’s 3.1 columns “Aid per one subsidized job”, “Aid
needed to reduce unemployment by 1%” (= vector p), and “Redistribution of aid” (=
vector x− a) both for separate and joint equalization.
The greatest redistribution takes place in East Germany, where the subsidies are far
from being optimal. Most affected are large cities. For instance, Berlin has to return all
subsidies back. Dresden, Magdeburg, Jena, Wismar, Schwerin, Rostock should receive
at most half their actual grants. On the contrary, some other areas should receive an
additional aid: Naumburg (277 Mio EURO), Stendal (179 Mio EURO), Bitterfeld (118
Mio), etc.
The optimization tries to reduce the highest unemployment by least expenditures. If
the unemployment is rather high, the model subsidizes the region even at a higher price.
If the unemployment is not much higher than the average but reducing it is affordable
then the model ‘gives a grant’. The last subsidized are the regions whose unemployment
is close to the average and at the same time reducing it is too expensive.
For instance, consider Berlin. It has a large population, and reducing its unemployment
by one percent requires subsidizing too many jobs, which makes this ‘percent’ much more
expensive than in small regions. On the other hand, Berlin’s net unemployment rate (with
no subsidies) 18.7% is very close to the East German average (18.7 − 18.21 = 0.49%),
so that it makes little sense to give a subsidy. Berlin’s actual unemployment 16.6%
means that the subsidy (536 Mio EURO) received was not only unnecessary but also
superfluous. Indeed, instead of fitting the unemployment to the average it results in
18.21− 16.6 = 1.61%-deviation, which is three times more distant from the average than
with no subsidies at all.
Besides the size of the region, the ‘price’ of 1%-decrement in unemployment is deter-
mined by the aid per one subsidized job. For instance, consider Naumburg with the ‘price’
of one job about 50 Ths EURO. Naumburg’s unemployment 21.4% significantly deviates
from the East German average 18.21%. Accordingly, it receives an additional subsidy,
in spite of a high ‘price’ for 1%-decrement in unemployment. If Naumburg is considered
within the whole of Germany, its influence on the variance is about 3/10 of its influence
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(c)  Redistribution of aid for separate budgets of East and West Germany
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(d)  Redistribution of aid for a joint budget of East and West Germny
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Figure 3.4: Redistribution of aid among German regions
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within East Germany (1/217 against 1/67). This is deciding, and Naumburg looses its
privilege and has to return the grant.
These and similar effects can be taken under control by certain weight coefficients. For
instance, one may adjust the optimization process not to ignore large cities, or localities
with expensive jobs like in ship-building.
3.4 Planning the budget for an equalization policy
Let us perform a kind of sensitivity analysis and investigate how the unemployment equal-
ization depends on the budget. Figure 3.5 traces the effects of the equalization policy as
a function of budget (a) for West Germany, (b) for East Germany, and (c) for the whole
of Germany.
(a) Consider the top graph for West Germany. Its horizontal axis displays the variable
budget. For several budget values, the regional unemployment is equalized. The
resulted optimal average unemployment and variance are put into the table on the
right hand. The corresponding table columns are depicted by dashed and solid
optimal curves in the graph, respectively.
The actual (2002) average unemployment and variance are marked in the graph by
asterisk * with the horizontal coordinate being the actual budget of West Germany
617.840 Mio EURO. Since neither the actual average unemployment, nor the actual
variance are optimal, the corresponding marks are located above the optimal curves.
(b) The next graph for East Germany is similar. In particular, it visualizes the fact
that the actual average unemployment is optimal: The corresponding mark is in
the dashed curve. The variance is not optimal and lies significantly above the curve
of optimal variance.
(c) For West Germany, the actual situation is not optimal either. The marks of actual
average unemployment and variance lie above the optimal curves. Comparing with
graph (b), graph (c) exhibits a much steeper decrease in the variance. This means
that a joint budget might be quite efficient and could better equalize the situation
in Germany than two separate budgets.
The curves and tables from Figure 3.5 enable us to predict the effect of an equalization
policy with a certain budget. For instance, if we speak of West Germany and test a budget
of 300 Mio EURO, then, under the optimal equalization, the predicted average regional
unemployment is 7.44% and the variance 4.21. If we dispose a budget of 1 Bio EURO
then the predicted average unemployment is 7.12% and the variance is 2.98. One can ask:
Are we ready to pay additional 700 Mio for such a minor improvement?
Using the curves and tables from Figure 3.5, one can answer similar questions and
select the most appropriate equalization policy with the best ‘quality-to-price ratio’ (the
understanding of which depends on the policy maker). Then the optimal distribution of
the budget among all the eligible regions follows immediately from the main model.
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(a)  Equalizing unemployment in West Germany
  Aid,       Average       Variance
  Mio   unemployment
EURO             %                %2
    100            7.63            5.17
    200            7.52            4.56
    300            7.44            4.21
    400            7.39            3.94
    500            7.33            3.72
    600            7.29            3.53
    700            7.24            3.36
    800            7.20            3.22
    900            7.16            3.09
  1000            7.12            2.98
  1100            7.10            2.87
  1200            7.07            2.78
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(b)  Equalizing unemployment in East Germany
  Aid,       Average       Variance
  Mio   unemployment
EURO             %                %2
  1000          21.66            3.13
  2000          20.70            1.58
  3000          19.97            0.92
  4000          19.22            0.55
  5000          18.47            0.33
  6000          17.75            0.21
  7000          17.14            0.13
  8000          16.51            0.08
  9000          15.88            0.04
10000          15.24            0.02
11000          14.60            0.00
12000          14.26            0.00
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(c)  Equalizing unemployment in the  whole of Germany
  Aid,       Average       Variance
  Mio   unemployment
EURO             %                %2
  1000          10.96          38.51
  2000          10.56          32.13
  3000          10.25          27.31
  4000            9.97          23.37
  5000            9.72          20.08
  6000            9.49          17.26
  7000            9.26          14.85
  8000            9.04          12.81
  9000            8.84          11.08
10000            8.65            9.61
11000            8.48            8.35
12000            8.33            7.24
Figure 3.5: Planning the budget of an unemployment equalization policy
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3.5 Economic gain from the model
As shown previously, the model promises a better equalization of the regional unemploy-
ment than actually attained. It implies that the actual degree of equalization is attainable
with a smaller budget. Say, the results obtained for 6 billion EURO can be obtained for
4 billion. Then the gain from the model is 2 billion.
Let us trace this train of thought with Figure 3.5. Consider the mark * Variance 2002
in the upper graph (a) for West Germany. It indicates the actual state attained for 617
Mio EURO. Moving to the left along the dash-dot line, we retain the equalization level but
reduce the budget. Attaining the optimal variance curve means that no further economy
is possible. The necessary budget is to be found below, 240.901 Mio EURO. Starting
from the mark * Average unemployment 2002 and proceeding in the same way, we find
the minimal budget for the actual average unemployment 7.45%, 280.737 Mio EURO.
The budget which suffices to retain both indices at the actual level is consequently the
maximal of these two, 280.737 Mio EURO. We save 337.103 Mio. If we restrict attention
to the variance only, as required by the equalization program, the minimal budget is
240.901 Mio, which saves 376.939 Mio. Then the average unemployment is 7.48% which
is 0.03% higher than the actual one.
These steps are tabulated in Table 3.2. Its three rows provide the estimates of economic
gain for West Germany, East Germany, and the whole Germany.
1. Consider the first row for West Germany.
(a) The first section State 2002 specifies the location of marks * in Figure 3.5. The
underlying data are represented by the second graph in Figure 3.1.
(b) The next section of Table 3.2 Optimal equalization displays the equalization
result for the whole budget. The optimal indices, compared with the actual
ones, indicate at a gain in quality. The underlying data are represented by the
bottom graph in Figure 3.1.
(c) Section Economy equalization AV answers to the question: How can the actual
budget be reduced with retaining both Average unemployment and V ariance
at the actual level? This section specifies the intersection of dash-dot lines with
the optimal curves in Figure 3.5.
(d) The last section Economy equalization V is similar but restricts the attention
to the V ariance only. It specifies the intersection of the dash-dot line through
the mark * Variance 2002 with the optimal variance curve in Figure 3.5.
2. For East Germany, the situation is rather curious.
(a) If we take care of both average unemployment and variance (Section Economy
equalization AV), no economy is possible (0 EURO). It is explained by the fact
that the average unemployment under the optimal equalization coincides with
the actual one (compare with Section Actual equalization).
(b) If we take care of the variance only then no grant is necessary at all (Section
Economy equalization V). Indeed, the natural self-regulation provides a better
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Table 3.2:Economic gain from the unemployment equalization
State 2002 Optimal equalization Economy equalization AV Economy equalization V
Average
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
Vari-
ance
Aid
amount
Average
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
Vari-
ance
Aid
amount
Average
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
Vari-
ance
Suffici-
ent
aid
Eco-
nomy
Average
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate
Vari-
ance
Suffici-
ent
aid
Eco-
nomy
% %2 Mio EUR % %2 Mio EUR % %2 Mio EURMio EUR % %2 Mio EURMio EUR
West Germany 7.45 4.40 617.840 7.28 3.50 617.840 7.45 4.27 280.737 337.103 7.48 4.40 240.901 376.939
East Germany 18.21 9.76 5360.100 18.21 0.28 5360.100 18.21 0.28 5360.100 0.000 22.93 9.17 0.000 5360.100
Whole of Germany 10.11 27.29 5977.940 9.49 17.32 5977.940 10.11 25.30 3486.612 2491.328 10.25 27.29 3005.170 2972.770
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variance than attained with the grant (see second and third graphs in Figure
3.2). Consequently, the total budget of 5360.100 Mio EURO can be saved.
3. The last row of Table 3.2 is similar, and exhibits the economy under both Economy
equalization AV and Economy equalization V of order 2.5–3.0 billion EURO.
This efficiency estimate is certainly conditional. However, the order of economy com-
parable with the total budget is very unlikely due to the model inaccuracies only. It rather
indicates at the really underused potential of the subsidies. Consequently, the situation
can be improved by either making the grants work with a full efficiency, or by saving a
considerable fraction of the grants.
Chapter 4
Conclusion
4.1 Further perspectives
A natural way of improving the model is explaining the regional unemployment as a
function of subsidies (2.2) on the basis of longer control periods. It will improve the
prediction accuracy of the model which is important for future planning.
Next, some more elaborated restrictions can be imposed, with regard to the size of
localities, industries, and social factors.
Finally, some weight coefficients can be introduces into the model to reflect certain
policy priorities.
The variance operator from Theorem 1 reduces computing the variance to a vec-
tor/matrix multiplication. This means that the restrictions and the prediction of the
net unemployment can be arbitrarily complex, but if they are linear then the optimiza-
tion problem is linear-quadratic and, consequently, solvable.
4.2 Recapitulation
1. The model developed contributes to equalizing the regional unemployment by opti-
mally distributing the subsidies granted.
2. The difference between actual and optimized figures show that, most likely, the
potential of active labor market policies is far from being exhausted.
3. In particular, it explains low efficiency of active labor market policies observed in
empirical studies.
4. The methods suggested are aimed at the optimal use of European and national
grants. Alternatively, policy goals can be attained with a more moderate budget,
saving money for other purposes.
5. Econometric decision models of this type can be developed further to improve the
performance of active labor market policies, implying socio-economical and political
advantages.
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